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1. Introduction 
Collecting taxes, policing and administering justice are among the most basic functions of 
government. Historically, states were in large part formed around interactions between government 
agencies and subjects/citizens over these issues (Levi 1988; Tilly 1990). It is around the same issues 
that public officials have the greatest licence to exercise coercion against citizens. There are 
powerful sensitivities about the character of the agencies that perform these functions, and strong 
reactions against any hint of commercialism in their governing principles. ‘Tax-farmer’, like 
‘mercenary’, has long been a term of disparagement (Stella 1993). It is then no surprise that 
suspicion has attended the rapid spread of (semi-) autonomous revenue agencies (ARAs) in Latin 
America and in Anglophone Africa1 over the past two decades. The task of collecting taxes has 
been taken from ministries of finance and given to revenue agencies that have some autonomy from 
central executive power and from rules governing public service recruitment, remuneration and 
procedures. In consequence, tax collectors, who are anyway often perceived as corrupt and 
privileged, generally have achieved very substantial increases in their formal salaries. Popular 
reaction has sometimes been adverse. President Museveni was probably speaking for many 
Ugandans when, in 2000, he described the Uganda Revenue Authority as a ‘den of thieves’ 
(Therkildsen 2004, p. 82).  
 
In the eyes of a few academics and external observers, the introduction of revenue agencies has 
been seen as a step on the road to privatisation of the revenue collection process (Kiser and Sacks 
2007; Devas et al 2001; Byrne 1995). The establishment of an autonomous revenue authority, with 
staff paid at rates similar to those in comparable private sector jobs, does indeed seem to parallel the 
process of putting state agencies on a commercial footing as a prelude to privatisation. We 
demonstrate in the article that this is a misreading of the story of revenue authorities in Anglophone 
Africa. There are a number of debates about the consequences of establishing these agencies, 
especially the effects on revenue collection performance. It is hard to reach firm conclusions about 
most performance issues. We can, however, be clear about a point of fact. Despite the rhetoric and 
debate about ‘autonomy’, there has been very little loosening of the political and bureaucratic grip 
of central executive authorities over the revenue collectors. Presidents and Ministers of Finance are 
still very much in control. It is almost equally certain that the creation of revenue agencies has eased 
and facilitated a series of ‘nuts and bolts’ reforms in the ways in which taxes are assessed and 
collected. It is likely that this has deflected pressures that might otherwise have emerged for 
substantial privatisation and commercialisation of the tax collection system. In Anglophone Africa, 
revenue raising will remain a core state function, controlled by the top political leadership. The 
creation of ARAs has improved relationships between tax authorities and larger corporate 
taxpayers, and increased, at least marginally, the capacity of governments to raise revenue.  
                                                     
1 We include in our definition of Anglophone Africa those countries where elites have become substantially Anglophone 
in the post-colonial period as a result of their aid and other relationships with Anglophone international organisations: 
notably Ethiopia and Rwanda. In Africa, the revenue authority model has been instituted in Ghana (1985), Uganda (1991), 
Zambia (1994), Kenya (1995), Malawi (1995), Tanzania (1996), South Africa (1997), Rwanda (1998), Zimbabwe (2001), 
Ethiopia (2002), Sierra Leone (2002), Lesotho (2003), Gambia (2005), and Mauritius (2005).  
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2. History and Geography 
Historically, ministries of finance have existed to collect and manage government revenues. They 
rarely have a complete monopoly over collection. Sub-national governments often collect property 
taxes in particular.2 Other taxes are sometimes collected by national agencies that enjoy some 
independence from finance ministries. This includes some of the organisations which collect import 
and export taxes: their border protection responsibilities, and partial orientation to security and 
policing roles, sometimes provides them with some autonomy. In resource rich countries, 
government income from oil, gas or minerals may be collected in whole or in part through dedicated 
ministries (e.g. of petroleum and mining) or state corporations. However, the global norm is that 
central government revenues are collected through units within ministries of finance. A consistent 
pattern of departure from this norm therefore invites explanation. Starting in the early 1990s, a large 
number of countries, nearly all in Anglophone Africa and Latin America, began to establish (semi-) 
autonomous revenue authorities, organisationally distinct from ministries of finance, and with some 
real operational autonomy. To date around 30 ARAs have been established, of which 15 are located 
in Anglophone Africa. The trend continues. Several other governments are currently considering 
joining in, including Burundi and Mozambique.  
 
The geography of this reform is not hard to explain. In the 1980s, experiences of sustained 
economic stagnation or decline were concentrated in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the 
Andean region, and most dramatically in Peru, state structures and public revenues had appeared on 
the point on total collapse in the mid-1980s (Taliercio 2004; Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). 
Perceptions of acute, deeply embedded crisis stimulated a wide range of economic, political and 
public sector reforms in Latin American and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. The establishment of 
ARAs was a component of a broader pattern. But why were ARAs widely adopted in Anglophone, 
but not Francophone Africa? For the answer we have to look to ideology and culture.  
 
From the mid-1980s, the New Public Management became a powerful movement in the 
Anglophone world, driven in particular by American intellectual scepticism about government and 
public bureaucracy and by strong commitments to actual reform from the Conservative Party 
government in Britain led by Margaret Thatcher, and the Labour Party government of New Zealand 
(Manning 2000; McCourt and Minogue 2001). A major component of the New Public Management 
programme was the organisational separation of the central policy functions of government from the 
tasks of implementation and service delivery, with, ideally, a contractual relationship between the 
two. For public organisations dealing with economic policy, public finance, and financial and 
economic regulation, the scepticism about the abuse of political and bureaucratic power embedded 
in the New Public Management movement was expressed in a preference for autonomous agencies 
that would make key decisions in the public interest, according to expert advice, and free of 
political interference in day-to-day operations. The most visible result was the move, mainly in the 
rich countries, for independent central banks. The case for giving autonomy to revenue collection 
agencies emerged naturally from New Public Management thinking. Its exact origin is not clear, but 
the staff of international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, warmed to and nurtured it. Neither institution ever publicly committed itself to ARAs 
as a matter of policy. Their staff tend to understate the extent to which they have actually 
encouraged governments to adopt the ARA model.3 Along with the UK national foreign aid agency 
(Department for International Development – DFID) and a linked network of Anglophone 
                                                     
2 In comparative historical perspective, sub-national government units in contemporary poor countries, collect very small 
shares of total public revenues.  
3 We say this on the basis of a wide range of interactions with people involved in these issues.  
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international consultants, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank played major 
promotion roles. Francophone Africa was not subjected to any similar barrage of persuasive ideas. 
 
Is the adoption of ARAs a good thing for Anglophone Africa? What effect has it had on the 
capacity of governments to raise revenues easily, fairly, honestly and legitimately? As we have 
suggested in the Introduction, the answers are not yet very clear. We summarise what we think we 
know in the Conclusion. We arrive at those conclusions by examining the experiences with ARAs 
in Anglophone Africa, with a particular eye on two related sets of questions that frequently arise in 
discussions of interactions between African countries and international aid and development 
organisations. The first set concerns the transnational transfer of institutions. There is a large 
literature on this phenomenon and special concerns when it seems to be driven by development aid 
and aid donors (Batley 1999; McCourt and Minogue 2001). ARAs clearly were not invented in 
(Anglophone) Africa. Is it a problem that they have spread so fast under the influence of aid and of 
international financial institutions? The second set of questions relates to the more specific issue of 
the autonomy of revenue agencies. To people versed in critiques of the aid business, giving 
autonomy to revenue agencies sounds like yet another way of fragmenting the authority of already 
weak central government institutions. It seems analogous to the much criticised ‘by-pass’ agencies, 
established within government to implement individual donor-funded programmes. Is it analogous? 
Is the autonomy of ARAs a problem? Our answers are largely ‘no’ to both sets of concerns. 
Addressing the questions enables us to explain what ARAs actually imply for state capacity in 
Anglophone Africa.  
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3. Institutional Transfer 
What actually has been transferred in the creation of ARAs? The first part of the answer has been 
given above: revenue collection agencies have been ‘extracted’ from the immediate organisational 
apparatus of ministries of finance and established as separate bodies. The second part of the answer 
is that the revenue collection apparatus has been unified in one institutional body.4 Previously, 
different taxes – like sales and turnover taxes, value added tax, import and export taxes, and 
personal and corporate income taxes – were generally collected by separate units within ministries 
of finance. ARAs take responsibility for all major taxes.5 The third and later parts of the answer are 
a little more complex. It is easier to deal with them by exploring the reasons that ARAs have been 
adopted. People in the business give a range of answers. As with other cases of organisational 
change, it is rarely possible to give definitive answers even for individual cases. Many different 
actors, domestic and foreign, were involved in each case. They likely had different motives, not all 
of which would have been put on the table or fully appreciated by the other actors involved. Further, 
understandings of the reasons for the change will have been influenced by the process of change 
itself. Several ARAs in Anglophone Africa were established more than a decade ago. Many of the 
original actors have moved on, and the organisations themselves have undergone continual 
modification. We can, however, get close to the truth by looking at the three main types of 
explanation normally given for the establishment of ARAs: (i) signalling political autonomy; (ii) 
creating managerial autonomy; and (iii) facilitating reform. We begin with the most ‘ideological’ 
(i.e. rooted in doctrine and deductive principles), and end with the most pragmatic.  
(i) Signalling political autonomy 
The most doctrinal answers are rooted intellectually in the New Institutional Economics and the 
New Public Management, and expressed in terms of concepts like credible commitment and 
signalling. The core problem is believed to lie in the capacity of both states, as legitimate public 
authorities, and of tax collectors, as corrupt abusers of positions of public authority, to extract 
money from taxpayers without adequate safeguards. There is a wealth of literature suggesting that, 
when faced with a corrupt tax collector, individual taxpayers will be better off if they pay a bribe, 
rather than refuse or try to join with other taxpayers in protective joint political action. They will be 
largely defenceless in the face of retaliatory penalising harassment from the tax man. A similar 
logic is applied to the capacity of governments (a) to use their taxation powers to harass political 
opponents and their financial supporters, and (b) to renege on any agreements they might have 
made to tax citizens reasonably after they have seduced them, with promises of moderation and 
good behaviour, into revealing their actual income and wealth. In short, the point of departure is the 
belief that neither governments nor their tax collecting agents can be trusted with powers over the 
taxation process. To the extent that they hand over that authority, in a binding and non-reversible 
way, to some independent authority that in turn can be trusted not to abuse it, and to abide by 
                                                     
4 Ghana is an exceptional case. Formally, it was the first country in Africa, and one of the first in the world, to establish 
an ARA, in 1985. It was at that point becoming one of the first and, for a while, most enthusiastic adopters of the policies 
of structural adjustment and market liberalisation favoured by the World Bank. We can take the formal adoption of an 
ARA partly as a signal of this willingness to work with the international financial institutions. However, the three main 
units of the Ministry of Finance responsible for three different sets of taxes remained organisationally distinct. The Ghana 
Revenue Authority still has not adopted digital technologies on a significant scale. While formally an early reformer, 
Ghana is in most respects a laggard. 
5 An IMF survey conducted early in 2006, covering 11 ARAs in Sub-Saharan (and Anglophone) Africa, found that every 
one of them was collecting income taxes and value-added taxes, and all but one were collecting customs duties and excise 
taxes, respectively. This accounts for all major categories of taxes. By contrast, only one, on the small island of Mauritius, 
was responsible for property taxes (Kidd and Crandall 2006, 89). 
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correct procedure and the law, taxpayers will have less to fear from the tax agency and its staff, and 
be more willing to declare their real income and wealth. More tax revenue will be forthcoming, less 
will leak into the pockets of the collectors, and the government itself will become more legitimate.  
 
The prescription corresponding to this diagnosis is to increase – perhaps even to maximise – the 
degree of autonomy that the revenue authority has in relation to politicians and government. 
Governments are urged to do this in their own self interests. It signals to business people and to 
potential investors that the power to tax will not be abused. Government has, according to a widely 
used term, tied its own hands. To use more technical jargon, it has made credible commitments to 
taxpayers about the integrity of future tax arrangements. There is no single formula for doing this; 
the word autonomy is abstract and does not translate directly into specific legal, procedural and 
organisational arrangements. There is, however, a relatively coherent package of formal measures 
that is likely to contribute to achieving this goal, provided only that informal power relations do not 
completely over-ride formal arrangements: 
 
1. Give the revenue agency a separate legal status, as a corporate body with clear legal 
responsibilities and duties, and wide powers to own assets, borrow money etc. 
2. Put it under the control of a management board whose members are independent of 
government by virtue of (a) being nominated from a diversity of sources, both inside and 
outside government;6 (b) having long, fixed periods of tenure, revocable only on clear 
criteria and through open and legal processes; and (c) having remuneration arrangements 
that cannot be affected by the current government.  
3. Place all staff clearly and directly under the authority of the chief executive, who will in 
turn be chosen by and answerable only to the management board. 
4. Provide an operational budget that is independent of the normal annual national 
budgeting process, either through constitutional provisions or by allowing the authority to 
fund itself through appropriating a fixed share of the revenues it collects.  
 
When they established ARAs, were the governments of Anglophone keen to signal political 
autonomy? The answer is a clear ‘no’. The evidence comes in two main forms. The first lies in 
formal governance arrangements. Formal structures and legal and administrative provisions differ 
sufficiently from one country to the next that it is hard to summarise governance arrangements in a 
few quantifiable measures. One of the most direct indicators relates to sources of finance. Outside 
Anglophone Africa, it is the norm that ARAs have access to sources of funding other than, or in 
addition to, the normal annual budget appropriations initiated by the executive and approved by the 
legislature. These alternative funding sources mainly take the form of entitlements to a proportion 
of revenue raised, and may also include some kind of performance bonus. Most ARAs in 
Anglophone Africa do not have access, even in principle, to any funding beyond the annual budget 
appropriations. They are thus under the direct financial control of government.7 Another useful 
indicator is the identity of the authorities responsible for appointing the chairs and members of ARA 
supervisory/management boards. In Anglophone Africa, it is either the President or the Minister of 
Finance in almost every case (Kidd and Crandall, 2006, 86-88). While almost every ARA board 
                                                     
6 It has become the norm to appoint at least one private sector representative to the management or supervisory boards of 
ARAs. Of the 20 ARAs on which information is included in the IMF’s 2006 survey, 16 had advisory, supervisory or 
management boards, and private sector representatives sat on 14 of these. The corresponding numbers for Anglophone 
Africa were 11, 10 and 9 (Kidd and Crandall 2006, 86-88). 
7 The IMF’s 2006 survey showed that only 2 of 9 ARAs located outside Anglophone Africa were dependent solely on 
annual budget appropriations, compared with 7 of the 11 ARAs in Anglophone Africa (Kidd and Crandall, 2006, 86-88). 
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includes a private sector representative, in every case s/he is chosen by government rather than by 
any independent organisation (ibid).8   
 
The more powerful evidence of the absence of political autonomy for ARAs in Anglophone Africa 
comes from observations of how they work in practice. There are many variations, but a close 
relationship between the chief executive of the ARA and the head of state is the norm. The South 
African Revenue Services (SARS) has been an ARA since 1997. Its chief executive since 1998 is 
one of the powerful people within the ruling African National Congress (Fjeldstad and Moore 
2008). The Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) has been able to count on the personal support of the 
President, who has played a major role in the campaign to change public attitudes toward paying 
taxes and corruption (FIAS/DFID 2006). In Uganda, President Museveni and people close to him 
personally are widely believed to intervene directly into the Uganda Revenue Authority 
(Therkildsen 2004). In Zambia, during Chiluba’s presidency (1991–2001), the management of the 
Zambia Revenue Authority found it difficult to maintain operational autonomy and to prevent 
political interference (von Soest 2006). For instance, the government instructed the Agency not to 
tax certain businesses, including enterprises owned by ruling party politicians that allegedly had 
never been subject to assessments or paid tax (ibid.). On the other hand, opposition politicians and 
former government members were subject to frequent tax audits and harassment from the tax 
authorities (Afronet 2002, p. 27).  
 
In pointing out the close subordination of ARAs to governments, we are not making an implicit 
critique of centralised rule in Anglophone Africa. The case for political autonomy is contentious, 
even on the practical grounds relating to efficient revenue collection. We are simply indicating that 
the more doctrinal and deductive arguments that can justify the autonomy of revenue agencies 
played no visible role in reform decisions. That in turn indicates that these reforms were not 
designed to facilitate significant privatisation of tax collection. Had this been the case, provisions 
would have been made, either in the original law or later, to give revenue authorities more 
independence from government to facilitate the commercialisation process – and especially to 
develop techniques for financing revenue authorities through retention of a proportion of tax 
receipts, rather than continue to rely on annual budget appropriations.  
(ii) Creating managerial autonomy 
The term autonomy is central to another explanation of why ARAs should be, and have been, 
established. This is managerial autonomy: the extent to which the managers are able to dispense 
with standard public service rules – about staff recruitment, deployment, promotion and 
remuneration; procurement, and operating procedures – in favour of some mixture of their own 
organisation-specific rules and managerial discretion. This is the normal explanation among 
taxation professionals worldwide for the establishment of ARAs (e.g. Kidd and Crandall, 2006, 90): 
the problem with the within-ministry arrangement is that standard public service rules and 
procedures make it impossible to run a tax collection operation as it should be run. Much of the 
argument can be lifted straight from orthodox New Public Management texts. First, managers need 
to be able to deploy resources flexibly to meet the particular needs of the tasks they are trying to 
achieve and the sectors in which they operate. Second, managers need to be able actually to manage 
their subordinate staff: to find ways of motivating them, rewarding them according to performance, 
and disciplining them if necessary. Standard public service rules and procedures – and sometimes 
the public service trade unions believed to lie behind them – are understood to be the main 
obstacles.  These arguments, and especially those relating to personnel management, do have 
                                                     
8 Of the 11 Anglophone African ARAs surveyed by the IMF in 2006, in 6 cases the chief executive is formally appointed 
jointly by the supervisory/management board and the government, and in 4 cases by the government alone. The only 
exception, where the board had sole formal appointing power, was Mauritius (Kidd and Crandall, 2006, 86-88). 
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particular plausibility, at least in principle, in relation to revenue raising. On the one hand, tax 
collectors regularly interact with highly paid private sector professionals: accountants, consultants, 
tax lawyers, tax advisers. It makes sense that the collectors should be paid enough, and otherwise 
motivated, to ensure a high quality cadre who will not be outwitted by people on the other side of 
the fence. Perhaps more important, the collectors should not all leave to serve on the other side of 
the fence, or otherwise take their scarce finance-related skills into the private sector. Further, since 
tax collectors are especially vulnerable to corruption temptations, there is a strong case for a distinct 
organisational form to make it possible effectively to monitor staff behaviour and exercise 
discipline. 
 
We should be wary of how we interpret the prevalence of ‘managerial autonomy’ explanations and 
justifications for establishing ARAs. For, at least on the part of tax collection staff themselves, there 
is a clear self-interest involved. The establishment of ARAs generally has been followed by 
substantial formal salary increases.9 However, had strong beliefs in New Public Management 
principles been the dominant motivation, two complementary measures would have been 
introduced. First, many if not all of the existing staff of tax collection units in ministries of finance 
would have been obliged to apply for jobs in the ARA, and been subjected to a rigorous selection 
procedure. This was the procedure followed at the establishment in 1991 in Peru of SUNAT, one of 
the earliest and most iconic ARAs. Political crisis, widespread insurgency and a period of 
hyperinflation had reduced the government’s tax take to around 4-6% of GDP, and President 
Fujimori had the space to take radical steps (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008). There has been little of 
this in Anglophone Africa. Existing tax collection staff generally have been transferred directly into 
ARAs.10 Second, disciplinary procedures would have been tightened up within ARAs, and more 
staff would have been penalised for the corruption that is widespread in many of them. However, 
the use of dismissals in the initial phases of some ARAs has not been sustained. In Tanzania, for 
instance, annual dismissals have in later years dropped to less than 2% of the staff total. Generally, 
the annual turnover of staff is low. In the Lesotho Revenue Authority, for instance, turnover is 
around 1–2 % per year (FIAS/DFID 2006b).  
 
In sum, arguments about the need for managerial autonomy did play big roles motivating and 
justifying the creation of ARAs. All have received substantial managerial autonomy. Since the 
motivating arguments have been developed and deployed within a global epistemic community of 
tax professionals, spanning international financial institutions, consultants and tax administrators 
(Stewart 2002), it is not surprising that those aspects of the New Public Management case for ARAs 
that would tend to inflict pain on the tax collectors themselves – re-selection on merit and 
strengthened anti-corruption procedures – have been rather neglected. 
 
                                                     
9 It appears, however, to have been difficult for some governments to maintain the generous remuneration packages for 
the tax authority amid an often unfavourable budget situation and increasing pressure from other segments of the public 
sector for pay increases in accordance with those paid to the tax officers. In several cases the real value of a tax officer’s 
salary has been eroded over time by inflation and by a reduction in additional benefits. For instance, nominal wages in the 
Tanzania Revenue Authority remained unchanged between 1996 and 2000 (Fjeldstad 2003). Staff members in the Zambia 
Revenue Authority also complained that their employment conditions had worsened in recent years; hence, in 2003, tax 
officers in the authority for the first time initiated a work slowdown to press for pay advances, overtime benefits, and 
reimbursement for housing and study loans (von Soest 2006, p. 109). The Uganda Revenue Authority provides another 
illustrative example. Between 1991 and 1998, nominal wages remained unchanged. In 1991, the URA staff on average 
received salaries eight to nine times higher than salaries for corresponding positions in the civil service. This factor had 
shrunk to a factor of four to five in 2000 (see Therkildsen 2004). 
10 One exception is the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) where all former staff members were dismissed and had to re-
apply for a position in the new revenue authority in 1996. Almost 1200 staff members, equivalent to more than a third of 
the total former work force, were not re-employed on evidence or suspicion of misconduct (Fjeldstad, 2003). A less 
dramatic approach was used in Uganda, where the entire staff of 1700 people was placed on probation at the inception of 
the Revenue Authority, and approximately 250 (14%) were dismissed in the initial screening (Fjeldstad, 2006). 
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(iii) Facilitating reform 
The most pragmatic argument for establishing an ARA is that this facilitates, in two distinct ways, 
other, more concrete reforms in tax administration. First, it sends a signal to external supporters of 
reform, especially to aid donors and to the international financial institutions, that the government is 
(a) serious about reform, and (b) is willing, by adopting an iconic idea, broadly to accept the reform 
agendas that they offer.11 Second, this decision impacts on internal constituencies, especially 
sources of potential resistance to reform within ministries of finance. It signals a clear commitment 
to change, and to willingness to recruit external support to ensure that this happens. The 
establishment of ARAs both reflects, and has helped create, a broad consensus about tax reform in 
the global epistemic community we mentioned in the previous paragraph. Over the last two or three 
decades, a strong international consensus about tax reform has emerged. The key elements are: the 
introduction of broad based value added taxes on consumption, simplified tax design and improved 
tax administration (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008). None of this requires the creation of autonomous 
tax agencies. But radical organisational reform facilitates many of the other more specific 
organisational changes that have become the norm: (a) introducing unique identification numbers 
for each individual taxpaying unit; (b) moving from a system organised around different taxes to 
one organised around localities and/or industries, such that individual tax payers have to deal with 
fewer tax officers; (c) establishing separate offices and procedures for different categories of 
taxpayers, typically starting with the creation of Large Taxpayer Units focusing on big companies; 
(d) beginning to physically separate ‘back office’ functions of assessing tax liabilities and auditing 
and cross-checking records from ‘front office’ functions of actually collecting money, to reduce the 
scope for direct extortion and bribery; (e) trying to make the process more ‘user-friendly’;12 and (f) 
generally exploiting the potential of new information and communication technologies. 
 
It is hard to assess the strength of this kind of instrumental motivation. The key players are unlikely 
to be fully transparent, or even necessarily to be fully and critically aware of the ways in which their 
own motivations and constructions of reality change over time. The only quantitative information 
we have on the issue comes from the 2006 IMF survey of ARAs. Respondents were given 8 
possible reasons why their ARA was originally established. The explanation that received the 
highest ranking was a rather anaemic claim about a general need for reform (‘low effectiveness of 
tax administration and low levels of compliance’). The second-ranked explanation was an assertion 
of instrumentality: ‘need for a catalyst to launch broader revenue administration reform’ (Kidd and 
Crandall, 2006, 90). This accords to our own impressions from experience. ARAs have been 
established in Anglophone Africa in large part as a means of advancing other, more specific, 
reforms. It is partly for that reason that, relative to ARAs in other parts of the world, those in 
Anglophone Africa are very similar to one another in basic form.13 Because their adoption had 
major signalling and symbolic dimensions, there was little motivation to extensively re-engineer the 
designs adopted in neighbouring countries with which there was a great deal of interaction. There is 
substance behind the listing, on the home web-page of the Rwanda Revenue Authority, of links to 
‘sister revenue authorities’ in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia (www.rra.gov.ra). 
 
                                                     
11 Appointing expatriates as chief executives can amplify this signal. Expatriates are currently serving as chief 
executive officers in the revenue authorities in Lesotho and Mauritius, and have done so for periods in 
Uganda and Zambia. 
12 Through, for example, opening customer-friendly ‘one-stop shops’, simplifying procedures, making 
possible online filing of returns, and providing extensive information for taxpayers in printed and digital form. 
13 We have already cited above evidence about the basic similarity of ARAs in Anglophone Africa, compared 
to others, in funding arrangements. A similar conclusion emerges when we look for the existence of what the 
IMF calls ‘empowered management boards’. In 2006, these existed in 9 of the 11 ARAs surveyed in 
Anglophone Africa, but in only 5 of the ARAs in other parts of the world (Kidd and Crandall, 2006). 
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4. Conclusion 
It is hard to sustain the argument that the ARA reform agenda in Anglophone Africa constitutes a 
significant neo-liberal project to weaken the state. The granting of a degree of managerial and 
strategic autonomy to tax administrations by creating semi-autonomous revenue authorities is in 
line with standard public sector reform practices in many countries; there is no reason, in logic, 
experience or intention, to see it as a prelude to privatisation. There are marginal exceptions. For 
some years, the collection of customs revenues in Mozambique was sub-contracted to Crown 
Agents, a not-for-profit British company owned by a number of public agencies. That arrangement 
was terminated, mainly because the reforms achieved few lasting results - the transfer of skills by 
foreign contractors was limited and the contract was very expensive for the government (Hubbard et 
al 1999). Moreover, recently some local government authorities in East Africa have outsourced the 
collection of property taxes and market fees to private contractors. There is, however, no 
compelling evidence that the privatisation of tax collection is a feasible means of enhancing 
revenues and to dealing with revenue corruption and other problems (Iversen et al 2006).  
 
Although each country that has established a revenue authority has done so under differing 
circumstances, there are some general patterns in the underlying political and economic 
circumstances that led them to do so (Taliercio 2002). First, governments have been greatly 
dissatisfied with the performance of revenue collection, especially in the face of fiscal deficits and 
expanding public expenditure needs, and with chronic inefficiencies that exist with tax 
administration by the ministries of finance (Mann 2004). Second, perceptions of widespread 
corruption and tax evasion, combined with high taxpayer compliance costs, led to calls for 
wholesale reform of the tax administration (Ghura 1998; Barbone et al. 1999; Fjeldstad 2003, 
2006). Third, in some aid-dependent African countries foreign donors were attracted to the concept 
of a semiautonomous revenue authority because it created opportunities for more widespread 
reforms of tax administration procedures (Therkildsen 2004).  
 
Evidence is inconclusive whether the establishment of a revenue authority has led to better revenue 
administration performance compared to what would have been the case had the tax administration 
remained a department within the Ministry of Finance. Certainly, the establishment of a semi-
autonomous revenue authority offers no ‘quick-fix’ to a country’s revenue and tax administration 
problems. Creating an ARA is expensive, may take a long time to achieve and require significant 
effort. However, a revenue authority can establish a platform from which change can be facilitated. 
The revenue authority model has the great merit of facilitating the degree of managerial autonomy 
that many tax administrations need. The creation of revenue agencies in Anglophone Africa has 
eased and facilitated a series of ‘nuts and bolts’ reforms in the ways in which taxes are assessed and 
collected. It is likely that this has deflected pressures that might otherwise have emerged for 
substantial privatisation and commercialisation of the tax collection system. Does the 
‘standardisation’ of ARAs mean they are inappropriate to Anglophone Africa? Not really. National 
financial institutions are relatively transferable. Tax administration and law are highly specialised 
subjects. Tax professionals naturally talk to one another when they can. The same technological 
changes and political and economic processes that have supported globalisation generally in recent 
decades have strengthened international professional networks and institutions in the tax business. 
 
Revenue authorities in Africa may have improved efficiency, but at the possible cost of 
accountability. Often driven by a single revenue performance target, the structures and motivations 
of ARAs may encourage concentration on revenue expansion from known businesses instead of 
widening the tax base and, in particular, to encourage some firms to deregister into the informal 
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sector. In Rwanda, for instance, 13 large companies contributed 80 percent of the total taxes in 2005 
(FIAS/DFID 2006). The removal from the tax net of those taxpayers who generate little net revenue 
is justified in terms of reducing both the administrative costs of collection incurred by the tax 
administration and the compliance costs incurred by taxpayers. This is contrary to the emphasis in 
principle within the current global tax reform agenda on broadening the tax net. We have no overall 
figures on changes in the total number of taxpayers in Anglophone Africa. However, it seems likely 
that there has been no big increase, and that, in many countries, the number of registered taxpayers 
has been reduced. We are not suggesting that a wider tax net is always a good thing. Our concern is 
that ARAs seems to encourage the exclusion of marginal payers from the tax net. The political 
arguments for inclusion are not made or heard. This would be less of a problem if the actual tax 
burdens in Africa were fairly and effectively distributed. But they are not. In particular, they often 
fall heavily on a small number of registered, formal sector companies.  
  
The inadequate separation of tax administration and tax policy appears to have exacerbated these 
challenges. In addition, budget processes are often insufficiently transparent, with planning being 
undermined by last-minute tax proposals that may not be well conceived and partisan. Different 
sectors and different size businesses appear to be affected in different ways: large businesses may 
have a disproportionate and/or dysfunctional influence through effective political connections and 
organised lobbying. Because contemporary tax collection always involves some exercise of 
discretion, the creation of a powerful, revenue authority not subject to adequate external constraints 
could expose other segments of taxpayers to extortion. The tax relationship will only work well if 
the taxpayer has some kind of protection against extortion, notably substantive taxpayers’ rights. 
Furthermore, if the autonomy of the revenue authority from the Ministry of Finance is established in 
conditions that create ill-feeling between the two, or provide few incentives to cooperation, then tax 
and budgetary policy may be compromised.  
 
Another challenge is embedded in the application of the concept of autonomy to an organisation that 
handles large sums of money. Managerial autonomy – to run a tax agency on a day to day basis in 
ways that make sense from a perspective of its special functions – seems very sensible. The 
problems lie at the level of political control. The top managers of a tax agency cannot be left free to 
dispose of its income as they wish. They should be responsible to someone or, preferably, to some 
institution. One problem with revenue authorities in some African countries is that the label 
autonomy has in practice disguised the fact that they have been answerable to only one person, often 
the President. 
 
At this point in time we can conclude that the ways in which revenue authorities have been 
introduced and promoted in Africa have led to problems which should have been foreseen. Above 
all, fascination with the potential of a single new ‘super-agency’ has distracted attention from the 
fact that, in tax raising as elsewhere in the public sector, good organisational performance often 
depends on the nature of the relationships among agencies. In particular: 
 
a) Tax administrations need to cooperate with the Ministry of Finance, especially over tax and 
budgetary policy. If a revenue authority is established in ways that stimulate rivalry and 
jealousy with the Ministry of Finance, cooperation might be severely jeopardized. 
b) If revenue authorities are not to be abused by powerful Presidents, and used as a private 
source of income or an instrument to intimidate political opponents, then their high status and 
managerial autonomy needs to be offset by pluralistic governance arrangements.  
 
Essentially, the personal relationship of the head of the ARA and the President is likely to be very 
important, since, in Africa, personalities matter a lot. The relative success of the Rwandan and 
South African revenue authorities appears to be the result of relatively good remuneration, strong 
internal controls, and clear political support for the tax authorities’ management and purpose. In 
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Rwanda, this is reflected in the President’s personal and vocal support for the RRA. In South 
Africa, the political support is based on a close relationship between the Commissioner of the SARS 
and the Minister of Finance dating back to the antiapartheid struggle. It is likely that the 
performance of African revenue agencies is likely to continue to be influenced by such relations. As 
organisation theorists have long argued, in the public service, sustainable organisational autonomy 
cannot be granted, but has to be continually earned. It is always under threat. The organisation has 
continually to demonstrate the value of its autonomy to those who could terminate it.  
 
The arguments about ARAs are, and are likely to remain, arguments about effective public sector 
organisation. Privatisation is not in sight. 
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SUMMARY
Since the early 1990s, many countries in Anglophone Africa have established (semi-) 
autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs), organisationally distinct from ministries of 
finance, with some real operational autonomy, and with staff paid at rates similar to 
those in comparable private sector jobs.  The introduction of revenue agencies has 
been seen by some as a step on the road to privatisation of the revenue collection 
process. We demonstrate in the article that this is a misreading of the story of revenue 
authorities in Anglophone Africa. This conclusion is reached by examining two related 
sets of questions. The first set concerns the transnational transfer of institutions. Is it 
a problem that ARAs have spread so fast under the influence of aid and of international 
financial institutions? The second set of questions relates to the more specific issue of 
the autonomy of revenue agencies. Is the establishment of revenue agencies another 
way of fragmenting the authority of already weak central government institutions? Our 
answers are largely ‘no’ to both sets of concerns.  Addressing these questions enables us 
to explain what ARAs actually imply for state capacity in Anglophone Africa.
Printed version: ISSN 0804-3639
Electronic version: ISSN 1890-5048
Printed version: ISBN 978-82-8062-231-0
Electronic version: ISBN 978-82-8062-232-7
